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Resumo
Hoje em dia a Internet está em todo o lado e é usada a toda a hora. É, portanto, de grande
importância garantir que as pessoas a usem de forma segura, especialmente quando envolve a
introdução de informação confidencial, como dados pessoais ou financeiros. Existe já uma grande
variedade de mecanismos que visam assegurar o máximo de privacidade e segurança possível dos
utilizadores quando acedem à Internet. No entanto, ainda há muitas técnicas que permitem não só
a invasão de sistemas de rede, mas também a extração passiva de informação sobre a atividade dos
utilizadores na Internet. Uma dessas técnicas são os ataques fingerprinting, que usam tamanhos
de resposta HTTP como informação side-channel.
Com a implementação do HTTP/2, já não é trivial obter informações sobre os tamanhos de
elementos web capturando tráfego da Internet. Isto acontece porque o HTTP/2 introduz pipeline
e multiplexagem de respostas, e, portanto, acredita-se que isso dificulta que atacantes determinem
tamanhos de respostas. No entanto, este assunto ainda não foi devidamente estudado.
Esta dissertação visa compreender as limitações que o HTTP/2 impõe nos ataques de finger-
printing a websites. Realizamos uma experiência de ataque fingerprinting na qual avaliamos a
influência do HTTP/2 em websites. Primeiro, pelo ponto de vista de ground-truth, em que recol-
hemos tráfego desencriptado de websites, selecionamos as features que melhor contribuem para a
sua identificação, e usamos classificadores e machine learning para determinar o desempenho do
ataque. Depois fazemos o mesmo numa perspectiva de ataque. Recolhemos o tráfego encriptado
e fazemos a sua análise usando estimativas de tamanhos de resposta HTTP feitas em trabalhos
anteriores. Finalmente, comparamos os resultados de ambas as abordagens.
Os resultados mostram que ainda é possível fazer, com sucesso, fingerprinting a websites
que utilizam HTTP/2. No entanto, o uso de pipelining e multiplexagem tem um impacto no
desempenho do fingerprinting e dos algoritmos de classificação.
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Abstract
In today’s world, the Internet is everywhere and is used all the time. It is then of great importance
to make sure that people are using the Internet in a secure way, specially when it involves the
sharing of sensitive information, such as personal or financial data. There is already a great variety
of mechanisms that aim at ensuring the maximum possible privacy and security of users when
accessing the Internet. However, there are still many techniques that allow not only the invasion
of network systems but also the passive extraction of information of user activity on the Internet.
One of these techniques are the fingerprinting attacks that use side-channel information consisting
of HTTP response sizes.
With the deployment of HTTP/2 it is no longer straightforward to obtain information about
sizes of web elements by capturing Internet traffic packets. This happens because HTTP/2 in-
troduces pipelining and response multiplexing, and so it is generally understood that this makes
it difficult for eavesdroppers to determine response sizes. However this has not been adequately
studied yet.
This dissertation aims at understanding the limitations that HTTP/2 imposes in website fin-
gerprinting. We conduct a fingerprinting attack experiment in which we evaluate the influence of
HTTP/2 in websites. Firstly, we take the ground-truth perspective in which we collect and decrypt
website traffic, select features that best help identifying websites, and use machine learning and
classification algorithms to determine the performance of the fingerprinting. Then we do the same
for an attacking perspective. We collect encrypted traffic and we analyze it by using estimates of
HTTP response sizes done in prior work. Finally, we compare results from both approaches.
Results show that it is still possible to successfully fingerprint websites which use HTTP/2.
However, the use of pipelining and multiplexing in websites does have an impact on how well
fingerprinting and classification algorithms perform.
iii
iv
Acknowledgements
Firstly, I thank my supervisor Professor Ricardo Morla, who was the one person that was always
available and present to help me in the most technical parts. He was the person who was more
directly related to this work, and without his inputs, advice and guidance, I would not be able to
finish it.
I thank my parents and sisters, who have always unconditionally supported me throughout my
academic career. I appreciate the monetary sacrifices they had to make for me.
My friends from FEUP. It was a pleasure to share working hours with you and thank you for
giving me a hand whenever I needed.
My friends outside FEUP. Always ready to crack open a cold one during the weekends. Thank
you all for the dinners, the moments and for clearing my head when I was struggling.
Francisco Estêvão
v
vi
“You affect the world by what you browse.”
Tim Berners-Lee
vii
viii
Contents
Resumo i
Abstract iii
Acknowledgements v
Abbreviations xv
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3 Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.4 Dissertation Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2 Literature Review 5
2.1 Encryption and Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 Web Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3 Side-channel Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.4 Fingerprinting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.5 Machine Learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.5.1 K-NN (K-Nearest Neighbors) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.6 Analysis of Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.6.1 Website Fingerprinting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.6.2 Feature Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.6.3 HTTP/2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3 Methodology and Data Set 15
3.1 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.1.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.1.2 Captures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.1.3 Data Extraction and Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.1.4 Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.1.5 Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.2 Characterization of the Data Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.2.1 Diversity of Websites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.2.2 Web Object Size for All Captures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.2.3 Large Web Objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.2.4 Example: Google . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
ix
x CONTENTS
4 Feature Selection and Analysis 27
4.1 List of Proposed Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.1.1 General Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.1.2 HTTP Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.1.3 Size Group Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.2 Characterization of the Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.3 Correlation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.4 Features Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.4.1 General and HTTP Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.4.2 Worst Case Result Feature Combinations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.4.3 Best Case Feature Combination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5 Results on Efficiency with HTTP/2 35
5.1 Comparison with Ground-truth Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5.2 Pipelining and Multiplexing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
6 Conclusions 41
6.1 Discussion of Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
6.2 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
6.2.1 More substantial Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
6.2.2 New Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
References 45
List of Figures
1.1 Usage of HTTP/2 for websites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1 Solutions for privacy preservation in the Web . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 Fingerprinting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3 General schema for machine learning methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.4 Example of K-NN Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.5 HTTP/2 multiplexing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.1 Methodology Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.2 Data Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.3 CDF of HTTP Response Data Sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.4 HTTP response data sizes higher than 100KB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.5 Google Homepage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.6 CDF of Google’s Web Object Sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.7 Number of SSL Bytes in TCP Connections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.1 Correlation of features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.2 First Confusion Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
5.1 Comparison of the Accuracy of Ground-Truth and Attack Features (K=1) . . . . 36
5.2 Comparison of the Accuracy of Ground-Truth and Attack Features (K=3) . . . . 37
5.3 Comparison of the Accuracy of Ground-Truth and Attack Features (K=5) . . . . 38
5.4 F1 score CDF, according to pipelining and multiplexing levels . . . . . . . . . . 38
5.5 Difference between GT and attack F1 scores CDF, according to pipelining and
multiplexing levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
xi
xii LIST OF FIGURES
List of Tables
3.1 Confusion matrix outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.2 IP Addresses used when accessing Google . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.3 Web objects per TCP Stream . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.1 Data Set Statistics by Feature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.2 Worst Features for K=1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.3 Worst Features for K=3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.4 Worst Features for K=5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.5 Best Features for K=1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.6 Best Features for K=3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.7 Best Features for K=5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
xiii
xiv LIST OF TABLES
Abbreviations and Symbols
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
API Application Programming Interface
B Byte(s)
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CDF Cumulative Distribution Function
CDN Content Delivery Network
DB Database
DOM Document Object Model
DoS Denial of Service
GT Ground-Truth
HTML Hypertext Markup Language
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTPS HTTP over TLS
IP Internet Protocol
JAP Java Anon Proxy
JS JavaScript
JSON JavaScript Object Notation
JSSE Java Secure Socket Extension
PDML Packet Description Markup Language
RC4 Rivest Cipher 4
SChannel Secure Channel
SQL Structured Query Language
SSL Secure Sockets Layer
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TOR The Onion Router
TLS Transport Layer Security
URL Uniform Resource Locator
VPN Virtual Private Network
WWW World Wide Web
XML Extensible Markup Language
XSS Cross-site Scripting
xv

Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter presents an overview of the background to which this dissertation belongs. We pro-
vide the general objectives as well as the motivations behind this work.
1.1 Context
Nowadays, the usage of Internet is everywhere. As of 2016 it was estimated that 81% of people
in the developed regions of the world used Internet1. In an era when access to the Internet is done
on a regular basis, it is of great importance to guarantee that people are doing it in a secure way,
specially when it involves the sharing of sensitive information, such as personal or financial data.
Most of the services and products that exist have web applications associated with them, which
usually follow the client-server model. Mobile or desktop, browser or app, users will lose control
of much of their information, which is inevitably exposed on the network and it is impossible to
fully guarantee its complete security and privacy, independently of how secure the system is and
how well it is implemented. There will always be flaws and vulnerabilities.
With regard to the development of the WWW, we are at a stage in which there is already a wide
range of mechanisms that aim at ensuring the maximum possible privacy and security of users, as
is the case of encryption and access control. However, there are still numerous techniques that
allow not only the invasion of network systems, but also the extraction of information for virtually
every type of Internet activity.
One of these techniques are the side-channel attacks. Side-channel attacks are based on side-
channel information, which is information that can be retrieved from the device responsible for
encrypting content. However, this information is neither plaintext information nor the one result-
ing from the encryption process, called the ciphertext. Instead, it consists in information that the
encryption device leaks. Examples include the varying power consumption during the encryption
computation or timing information retrieved by observing responses provided by the system under
attack.
1ICT Facts and Figures 2016, 2016. URL: http://www.itu.int:80/en/ITU-D/ Statistics/Pages/facts/default.aspx
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Timing attacks are an example of side-channel attacks [1]. In these, attackers are able to extract
information from a security system by making statistical analysis of the time the system takes to
respond to queries [2].
Other side-channel attacks make use of the size of web objects. In this type of attack, the
statistical analysis usually culminates in the defining of a fingerprint for each web application.
This is the reason why this type of attacks can also be called fingerprinting attacks, mainly because
what the attacker does is collect information about a web application and build a profile (the
fingerprint of that web application). This means that every specific characteristic or behavior of a
web application translates to the way the packets generated by it are organized, which is such that
it can be identified afterwards. Stored profiles can then be compared with captured data from the
victim [3]. Ultimately, this will enable the identification of the website the victim is accessing.
Encryption, and TLS in specific, encrypts application layer data. This means that some meta
data of the communication may still be available. Source and destination IP addresses, hostnames
and payload sizes are not encrypted. Thus, it is possible to directly tell the IP address of the desti-
nation server by a simple IP database lookup. However, this is a simplistic method, because there
are several actions a user can do inside a website that has the same IP address. More importantly,
the IP address of the server with which the browser is communicating may not reveal everything
about the website’s identity. This may happen due to the use of proxies or CDNs, which have a
growing amount of traffic passing through them. These may share IP addresses between applica-
tions and thus it is not sufficient to inspect IP addresses to identify a website.
1.2 Motivation
Side-channel analysis techniques are something to be concerned about. These attacks can be
generated and implemented quickly and using limited resources, which means that it is within the
reach of virtually anyone with minimal knowledge of computers and networking. Furthermore,
the time one has to spend in order to obtain valuable information from a side-channel attack only
depends on the amount of websites to analyze, although it may depend on the type of attack and
on the computational resources available.
In May 20152 a new version of the network protocol used on the WWW was released: HTTP/2.
In October 2016, 10% of the largest 10 million websites had implemented and were using HTTP/23,
including popular websites such as Google, YouTube, Facebook and Twitter. Furthermore, the
trend is that these values will continue to grow. In only 8 months, the value has grown 50%, with
almost 15% of the websites using this protocol. Figure 1.1 shows the recent historical trend of this
statistic.
2Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Hypertext Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2). URL:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7540
3Web Technology Surveys. Usage Statistics of HTTP/2 for Websites, November 2016. URL:
https://w3techs.com/technologies/details/ce-http2/all/all
4Web Technology Surveys. Usage Statistics of HTTP/2 for Websites, June 2017. URL:
https://w3techs.com/technologies/details/ce-http2/all/all
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Figure 1.1: Usage of HTTP/2 for websites (%)4
With this new version, it is no longer straightforward to obtain information about sizes of
web elements by capturing Internet traffic packets. This happens because HTTP/2 enables the
pipelining of requests, as well as the multiplexing of responses over a single TCP connection,
which makes it difficult to identify web elements and their size [4]. Thus, attacks that use element
sizes of a web application as the main source of information may no longer work.
HTTP/2 has generally a better performance than its previous versions and so it is considered
to be superior. It is then to be expected the rapid growth of the usage of this protocol and therefore
this study gains another importance and dimension.
1.3 Objectives
The goal of this study is to develop an approach to identify a website by observing the application
layer information. If this method is proven to be satisfactory, it can be the basis to the identification
of several actions a user can take in a website, such as publishing a post on Facebook, loading a
video on Youtube or messaging via Messenger [5].
This dissertation aims at characterizing and analyzing until what extent it is possible to finger-
print web applications that employ HTTP/2. The website fingerprinting done in this work seeks
to identify web pages by passively observing the communication traffic of the application layer
(HTTP and TLS). The traffic contains packet lengths, information about the direction of each
packet, and application-specific features that could individually identify the web page. This web-
site fingerprinting attack uses machine learning and classification algorithms. These techniques
extract the most important information from the communication traffic and try to predict to which
website does each traffic pattern belongs to.
4 Introduction
In addition to using the classification algorithms, we systematically evaluate the performance
of different sets of information we feed the classification algorithms. This allows us to understand
the relevance of the different information we extract from the traffic.
The main contributions of this thesis are the following:
• Selection of the best features for the identification of a website
• Try to understand the limitations of fingerprinting in HTTP/2 web applications, using the
estimation of HTTP response sizes described in [4]
1.4 Dissertation Outline
In addition to the Introduction, this dissertation contains more 6 chapters. In chapter 2, fundamen-
tal concepts are explained, the state of the art is described and related works are presented.
Chapter 3 shows the approach used to do this dissertation, and explains it step by step: how the
captures were done (3.1.2), how the data was extracted and processed (3.1.3), how the classifica-
tion was done (3.1.4) and what metrics were used to analyze the performance of the classification
algorithm (3.1.5). Furthermore, this chapter goes into detail about the data set used to make the
study of this dissertation, presents statistical measures about it and explains them.
Chapter 4 enumerates the features chosen to analyze website traffic. These are the key to
obtain better results. We also present the first results for these features. Here, there is complete
access to every traffic detail. It is the result of the first approach of this study. On the other hand,
chapter 5 presents the results for the study targeting web applications when there is encryption.
Finally, chapter 6 summarizes and debates the results as well as it proposes further studies that
can be made in order to improve this study.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
In this chapter, the basic concepts necessary to understand this work are described. At the same
time there are references and explanations of what has already been studied in this field, namely,
the state of the art.
2.1 Encryption and Privacy
In general, the field of cryptography studies ways of ensuring secure communications while there
are parties that try to access the information shared in that communication. A communication that
enjoys the quality of only allowing authorized parties to access its information is considered a
communication that possesses confidentiality.
Encryption is the process of converting ordinary and raw information (plaintext) into unin-
telligible information (ciphertext) through various transformations of the former [6]. Encryption
began thousands of years ago. From the ancient Greeks and Spartans, who used an encryption
tool called scytale [7], to the 20th century rotor machine Enigma, used in the First World War,
until modern ciphers like AES, there has always existed the need of guaranteeing confidentiality
in communications.
Where there is an intention of making something so that it cannot be accessed by everyone,
there will inevitably be people pursuing ways of breaking those techniques. That is why cryptog-
raphy has to be constantly improving and finding new algorithms and methods, which are better
and more secure than the previous ones. Technology is constantly evolving, but it does not only
improve security methods, but also methods to break them. Consequently the standards of every
age in history are always eventually broken.
The focus of this thesis is privacy of users accessing web applications. There are several ways
of attacking these applications, such as XSS or SQL injection. These attacks focus on the flaws of
how the application itself is implemented and consist in actively breaking in the websites. Encryp-
tion does not play a role in defending against these. Rather, encryption prevents the interception of
information and in the case of HTTP, the protocol responsible for that is TLS1. SSL was a previous
1Network Working Group. HTTP Over TLS. URL: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2818
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version of TLS and this protocol is sometimes referred to as TLS/SSL. The implementation of
this protocol in web applications usually culminates in the usage of the HTTPS protocol, which
consists in a communication over HTTP but having the connection encrypted by TLS. Thus, the
security of HTTPS is the one of TLS 2.
The primary goal of this protocol is to provide privacy and data integrity between two com-
municating applications. Ideally, communications secured by this protocol have the guarantee that
the connection is private and reliable 3, and that is why client-server applications use it to prevent
eavesdropping and tampering.
There are many different TLS implementations, such as OpenSSL, JSSE (Oracle), s2n (Ama-
zon), SChannel (Windows) or Secure Transport (Apple). Every TLS implementation varies in
some aspects, such as:
• The version of the protocols. For example, OpenSSL supports DTLS 1.2 4, but JSSE does
not;
• Encryption algorithms. Some use block ciphers while others use stream ciphers;
• Data Integrity algorithms;
• Key exchange algorithms.
Key exchange algorithms are related to session keys (used in this work and explained in section
3.1.2), which are symmetric keys used for encrypting messages in a communication session, as it
happens in web browser sessions. In turn, symmetric keys are the cryptographic keys used in
symmetric-key algorithms, which use the same keys for both encryption of the plaintext and the
decryption of the ciphertext.
Essentially, even with encryption some information can leak and this is due to the way differ-
ent software implements TLS. Over the past there have been several attacks on TLS, exploiting
the specifics of the protocol. Some of them attempt to discard TLS by modifying unencrypted pro-
tocols that request the use of TLS, which are called SSL Stripping attacks. Other attacks leverage
cryptographic weaknesses, such as the BEAST attack, which exploits the stream cipher CBC, or
attacks on the stream cipher RC4. There are some others that even make use of the server’s private
key so that they are able to decrypt sessions [8].
To protect users and to ensure their privacy, using encryption is a central issue. However,
there are many aspects of privacy and not all related to cryptographic protocols. There are nu-
merous examples of application service providers which use private data for purposes other than
what the application needs. Search engines like Google or Bing possess significant amount of
personal information about users’ web browsing history, and many general retail websites track
2E. Rescorla. HTTP Over TLS. URL: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2818
3Tim Dierks. The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2. URL: https: //tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246
4OpenSSL: OpenSSL 1.0.2 Notes, September 2014. URL: https://web.archive.
org/web/20140904045720/http://www.openssl.org/news/openssl-1.0. 2-notes.html
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visitor’s shopping habits. The possession of this type of information without the individual’s ex-
plicit concern is a violation of privacy. Some web application providers share this information
with advertisers or other third parties 5 and even sell this information 6.
Some solutions have been proposed for the threat that exists to online privacy. Tools like
firewalls, anonymizers (like TOR) and VPNs are examples of technology-enabled solutions for this
problem. Another example is the social networking service that preserves user’s privacy in social
network applications, proposed in [9]. There are also regulation-enabled solutions like mandatory
policies that providers have to comply with [10]. A summary of the existent solutions is shown
in Figure 2.1. This work is related to encrypted-based solutions (bottom right of the figure), by
testing until what extent they are reliable.
Figure 2.1: Solutions for privacy preservation in the Web [10]
2.2 Web Applications
Web applications are client-server software applications in which the client accesses the server
side through a web browser. These applications can be of a wide range of types. There are web
applications for webmail (web-based email), wiki, instant messaging services, social networks
among many others.
5Tracking the Trackers: Where Everybody Knows Your Username. URL: /blog/2011/10/tracking-trackers-where-
everybody-knows-your-username
6Goldman. Your phone company is selling your personal data. URL:
http://money.cnn.com/2011/11/01/technology/verizon_att_sprint_tmobile_privacy/index.htm
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Web applications are distinct from web pages in the way that the former are dynamic and are
similar to a desktop software application, but instead they run in a web browser. Web pages can
be dynamic or static. In static web pages the content (HTML, images, etc.) is always delivered
in the same way, regardless of the visitor. On the other hand, dynamic web pages are controlled
by scripting languages and have content that may change. These can be dynamic both on the
server and on the client side. On the server side these are controlled by server-side scripts which
rule the way the web page should behave on the client side. The content on the server is the
same, but it contains dynamic code, which may serve different data to a visitor, depending for
example on variables such as the geographical location of the visitor, the time of the day or even
on who is accessing the web page. Web pages that are dynamic on the client-side are processed
using scripting languages such as JavaScript, which determine the way the HTML is parsed into
the DOM, which is the special language for web pages that are already loaded and ready to be
interpreted by the browser 7.
In what regards traffic analysis, the variation of content can also be due to several other rea-
sons such as advertisements (although these cause variation in incoming packets but not outgoing
packets), and, for example, in news websites it is an inevitable event because news are constantly
changing and so does the content of the website.
Fundamentally, the constant change of content in web pages handicaps the identification of
websites, which is the ultimate goal of this study and is explained in section 2.4.
2.3 Side-channel Attack
As it was briefly described in 1.1, side-channel attacks are ways of collecting leaked information
from a cryptosystem. However, instead of taking advantage of flaws of the cryptographic algo-
rithms, or doing brute force attacks, side-channel attacks passively explore the implementation
of the system and its weaknesses. Information resulting from this reconnaissance is called side-
channel information, which consists in information which is neither the raw data (before being
submitted to the cryptosystem) nor the resulting data. Thus, it is considered information that is not
directly related to the data to be encrypted.
The idea that it is possible to extract information with a side-channel attack approach has
existed since mid-last-century. In the example described in [11], there was a teletype machine
which emanated electromagnetic signals that could be translated into the plaintext message that
the machine was processing.
In 1985, Wim Van Eck published the first paper on the now called Van Eck phreaking, which
is a form of eavesdropping in which side-band electromagnetic emissions are picked up from
electronic devices that correlate to hidden signals or data for the purpose of recreating these signals
or data. These emissions are present and can be captured from devices such as keyboards and
printers and are used to spy on these electronic device [12].
7How does the Internet work - W3c Wiki. URL: https://www.w3.org/wiki/How_does_the_Internet_work
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Side-channel attacks have been discussed in contexts other than encrypted communications,
namely timing analysis, unintentional leaks of electrical or radio signals, power consumption,
sounds and mechanical vibrations.
Regarding encrypted communications, there has been proof that timing attacks are effective
in extracting private keys from web servers based on the software OpenSSL [13]. Further studies
show that other characteristics of web applications, such as low entropy input, stateful commu-
nications and significant traffic distinctions make the side-channel leak of information a serious
privacy problem [14] and something to be concerned about.
2.4 Fingerprinting
In [15] fingerprinting is described as the process of mapping an item with large data to a shorter
version (the fingerprint), which uniquely identifies the original data. The name of this process
is due to the similarity to human fingerprints, which are unique and can therefore identify an
unknown person by finding a match in a database of known fingerprints [16].
A fingerprinting attack is the process of using fingerprinting techniques in order to break into
computer systems or gaining access to information unduly. An example of this kind of attack is
the TCP/IP stack fingerprinting, which consists in the process of determining the identity of an
operating system of a remote host by analyzing packets from that host. There are other targets to
fingerprinting attacks such as computing devices, audio and digital video.
This dissertation’s approach is closer to website traffic fingerprinting, in which the attacker
recognizes the traffic patterns and packets sent and received from specific web pages the victim
is accessing. All this happens despite the fact that the victim is using encryption, which gives the
victim a false feeling of security. The main objective of an attacker in a website fingerprinting
attack is to identify the web page the user is visiting, by observing their communication traffic.
Figure 2.2 illustrates a general fingerprinting attack. The attacker first gathers information
about websites. He accesses them and observes their contents, captures the traffic and stores the
traffic information. Later, in order to do the attack, he passively observes and captures the traffic
of his victim. This time, because it is encrypted, the attacker can’t observe the contents. However,
the attacker can compare it to the information he has stored and obtain valuable information in the
communication of the victim.
2.5 Machine Learning
Machine learning is the science of getting computers to learn from data by finding patterns and
hidden insights, all without being explicitly programmed where to find them. It is derived from
the study of pattern recognition and computational learning theory in artificial intelligence. As the
name implies, machine learning studies the implementations of algorithms in machines, so that
they can learn and make predictions on data. These algorithms improve with experience. Machine
learning can also be defined as a method of analyzing data that automates the building of models.
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Figure 2.2: Fingerprinting
Classification is the field of machine learning that studies the prediction of the testing data
set (observation), in terms of identifying to which category/label it belongs. This prediction is
based on a training set of data, from which it is acknowledge to which label it belongs. Figure 2.3
illustrates in a general way how machine learning and classification algorithms work.
Figure 2.3: General schema for machine learning methods [17]
2.5.1 K-NN (K-Nearest Neighbors)
K-NN is one of the simplest algorithms used for classification and regression [18]. In this work,
it was used for classification. Essentially, an object (testing data) is classified based on the class
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to which most of its neighbours belong. The closeness of one object to its neighbors can be
measured for example by their Euclidian distance. The number of neighbors to take into account
is the parameter K, a positive integer. For example, if K = 1, it means that the object is going to
be assigned to the class of its closest neighbor, if K = 3, the object is going to be assigned to the
majority of its 3 nearest neighbors. If there is a tie in the number of neighbors, choosing one class
randomly can be a method for breaking them.
Figure 2.4 shows an example of the application of the K-NN algorithm. In a case in which
K = 3, the testing data (black dot in the middle) is going to be classified as a red triangle because
the 3 nearest neighbours (inside the continuous circumference) are mostly red triangles. However,
if K = 5, the testing data will be labelled as blue square, because its 5 nearest neighbours (inside
the dashed circumference) are mostly blue squares.
Figure 2.4: Example of K-NN Classification
The previous paragraph describes the importance of choosing the right parameters, which is
the biggest challenge in any machine learning and classification algorithm. The values chosen for
K in this dissertation were 1, 3 and 5. Firstly, we only chose odd values so that there were no ties
while choosing classes. Then, we chose the smallest values so that the classification it was not
computationally expensive.
Additional parameters can play an important role in this algorithm, such as the weight of
different types of data. As it is further explained in this dissertation, in the data set, there is
information which is more important than the rest, and so it deserves to have a bigger impact on
the application of the algorithm.
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2.6 Analysis of Related Work
2.6.1 Website Fingerprinting
One of the first uses of the term Website Fingerprinting was done by Hintz in [19]. However,
the website fingerprinting idea had already been indicated in [20], when it was mentioned that
encrypted SSL records could be identified by analyzing traffic. There have been several studies
on the impact of such attacks in different situations. Dynamic web pages have proven to make
fingerprinting techniques perform poorly [3]. The TOR browser has been a constant target for
testing the feasibility of fingerprinting attacks, due to its anonymity based on layers of encryption.
Some results show that when using this browser, the attacks have low accuracy, mainly when there
are variables such as multi-tab browsing behavior, Internet connection and website variance over
the time [21]. On the other hand, there have been results proving that these anonymity tools (TOR
and JAP) can be correctly detected with a rate of almost 75% [22].
2.6.2 Feature Definition
Captured traffic contains every detail about the communication. However, as it was already stated,
only application layer data is required for this approach and so it is necessary to define how to
process that data. To do so, it is necessary to define which features of websites we are going to
analyze.
In [23], the feature used was the frequency distribution of IP packet sizes, which is too general,
as it is unaware of internal matters of the Privacy Enhanced Technologies (PET) targeted (VPNs,
SSL proxies, OpenSSH tunnels, TOR). [3] proposes a feature termed as Surge Period, which is
defined based on the timing of surges in traffic density or high bandwidth utilization.
This study is based on the feature definition of [22], which considers features such as the total
transmitted bytes, occurring packet sizes, percentage of incoming packets and number of packets.
However, there has not been studied the influence of the number of web objects of specific
sizes.
2.6.3 HTTP/2
HTTP/2 is an optimized version of HTTP, which came with the intention of enabling a faster and
more efficient use of the network. It is based on Google’s SPDY protocol, which already tries
to solve the HTTP/1.1 latency problems through multiplexing. Besides supporting all the essen-
tial features of HTTP/1.1, HTTP/2 brings major improvements, mainly performance related. For
example, in HTTP/2 each request/response exchange is associated with its own stream, which is
independent from other streams and does not interfere with them, which results in the multiplex-
ing of requests, as shown in Figure 2.5. In this protocol, flow control and prioritization are also
present, which allow the multiplexing to be done in an efficient way. HTTP/2 introduces a new
basic unit called frame, and each of these has a different purpose. Some build the basis of the
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requests and responses (frames HEADERS and DATA) while others serve for other features (SET-
TINGS, WINDOW_UPDATE). Header compression is also offered in this version of the protocol,
by compressing HTTP header fields that hold redundant data 8.
Figure 2.5: HTTP/2 multiplexing 9
There has been great accession to HTTP/2 and most of the major browsers already support it
10 11 12. HTTP/2 is specified to work with or without encryption 1314, but in spite of this fact most
web browsers only support it with encryption 15. Besides web browser supporting it, there are also
already millions of websites which use this version of HTTP 16.
With the arrival of a new version of a widely used protocol it is inevitable to test if there
are no flaws or weaknesses regarding its security and performance. So far, only few experiments
have been done, although there have been already some breakthroughs. [24] shows that it can be
fairly easy to carry out DoS attacks by exploiting HTTP/2 packets. A measurement platform that
monitors the performance in the adoption of HTTP/2 showed that 80% of websites supporting it
decrease page load latency when compared to HTTP/1.1 [25]. However, there is still the urgent
need for a reliable and thorough way of covering and analyzing HTTP/2 implementations.
HTTP/2 pipelining and multiplexing is assumed to prevent HTTP response size analysis at-
tacks. This is believed to work because with request pipelining there is no need to wait for the
response of an HTTP request in order to send the next request. Furthermore, response multiplex-
ing enables servers to send consecutive responses without waiting for the first ones to be finished.
However, this has not been proved yet to be an efficient way of hiding HTTP response sizes. There
was made an initial study [4] on the effect of pipelining in the attempt at hiding this. The study
described there makes an approach of estimating HTTP response sizes from TLS records. This
estimation is a strong influence on this study and the basis of the fingerprinting of the websites.
8Mike Belshe, Martin Thomson, and Roberto Peon. Hypertext Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2). URL:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7540
9HTTP: HTTP/2 - High Performance Browser Networking (O’Reilly). URL: https://hpbn.co/http2
10https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/ie/2014/10/08/http2-the-long-awaited-sequel
11https://wiki.mozilla.org/Networking/http2
12https://www.mnot.net/blog/2014/01/04/strengthening_http_a_personal_view
13HTTP/2 Frequently Asked Questions. URL: https://http2.github.io/faq
14M. Belshe, R. Peon, and M. Thomson. Hypertext Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2), May 2015. URL:
https://http2.github.io/http2-spec
15Networking/http2 - MozillaWiki. URL: https://wiki.mozilla.org/Networking/http2
16Web Technology Surveys. Usage Statistics of HTTP/2 for Websites, November 2016,2016. URL:
https://w3techs.com/technologies/details/ce-http2/all/all
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The approach done there has two parts. In the first, the TLS records of each TCP connection
are segmented into sets of HTTP request-response sequences that are contained entirely in each
segment. Then they look for gaps in the sequence of timestamps of the records and use the gaps
to segment the TCP connections. A gap is declared in the TCP connection when the difference
between the timestamps of consecutive TLS records from the server is larger than 0.5 seconds or
larger than 20 times the average back-to-back response gap from the server. In the second part,
the sets of HTTP request-response of the segmented TCP connections are analyzed in order to
compute response sizes.
Website fingerprinting is something yet to be effectively tested in web applications using
HTTP/2. This work is motivated by these previous studies and its aim is to improve the efficiency
of fingerprinting attacks on web applications which employ HTTP/2.
Chapter 3
Methodology and Data Set
This chapter describes the procedure followed in this dissertation. We describe and explain each
step taken and its purpose in the achieving of the objectives of this work. This chapter also analyzes
the data set used in this study and take the example of a website (Google) and examine its data in
more depth.
3.1 Methodology
3.1.1 Overview
The methodology used has two phases. The first one is the ground truth perspective, which means
that there is complete access to all of the contents of the packets exchanged with the website. It
is indispensable to know this ground truth so that it is possible to have full assurance of what is
what, in order to later predict and try to identify a website. For example, if in a website there is
a sequence of packets with a specific order, which are easily identifiable from every other set of
packets (even with encrypted traffic), it is crucial to know what those packets are (if images or
scripts, etc.) and to which website they belong to.
The other phase is from the perspective of the attacker. Here, only the encrypted information
is available, which represents a situation of an actual attack. For this case, we used the estimate of
HTTP response sizes used in [4]. The ultimate goal is to be able to tell, from that information, what
is the website in question, with some degree of certainty. For each of the 200 websites chosen,
there were made 10 repetitions for each.
3.1.2 Captures
The websites chosen were the top 200 websites in the world according to Alexa’s list The top 500
sites on the web, as of February of 2017. This list ranks websites according to several indicators,
such as:
• Daily Time on Site: the daily time on the website per visitor;
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Figure 3.1: Methodology Overview
• Daily Pageviews per Visitor: the daily unique pageviews per visitor on the website;
• % of Traffic From Search: the percentage of all referrals that come from search engines;
• Total Sites Linking In: the total number of sites that link to the site.
To get the traffic data that websites generate, we resorted to the traffic capture of those web-
sites, so that they could then be analyzed. To do so, we used the foremost and widely-used network
protocol analyzer Wireshark, as well as the command-line packet analyzer tcpdump. In the first
phase, in which we wanted the full disclosure of the packets’ contents, there was the need to
decrypt them.
Modern web browsers, such as Google Chrome and Mozilla Firefox, have a feature called SSL
Key Log. This log file contains the symmetric session key used to encrypt the TLS traffic. Thus,
after exporting the file, it can be used to decrypt the traffic with a protocol analyzer. If using the
operating system Linux, as was the case, the command needed to extract the file is the following:
$ export SSLKEYLOGFILE = / p a t h / t o / s s l k e y . l o g
The capture of the website was straightforward. It consisted simply in opening the web
browser (in this case it was Google Chrome), entering the URL of the website, including the spec-
ification of the HTTP protocol over TLS (https://<url>), and waiting for it to load completely,
which is determined by the moment the title of the HTML page appears on the browser’s tab. In
this work, only the homepages of the websites were considered. Collecting a large data set re-
quired us to automate all these steps. In order to do so, we used the Selenium web driver as well as
ChromeDriver. These tools work in the following way: Selenium provides the language bindings,
and Chromedriver is an executable which acts as a bridge between the web browser (Chrome) and
the driver. 1
1https://github.com/SeleniumHQ/selenium/wiki/ChromeDriver
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The final product of this step is a .pcap file, which is the standard for files originated by
capturing network traffic. This file is the input for the next step, which is the data extraction from
the capture.
3.1.3 Data Extraction and Processing
From the .pcap files resulting from the capture of each website, we proceeded to the extraction of
the relevant information in those files. To automate, organize, filter and select the intended capture
fields, (TLS and HTTP/2) we made use of scripts. The ultimate goal was to obtain a .db file storing
all the desired information.
The information in the .pcap file was first extracted using tshark, a terminal-based Wireshark.
The command was the following:
$ t s h a r k −nr < p c a p f i l e n a m e > −2 −o \
s s l . k e y l o g _ f i l e : < s s l k e y s f i l e n a m e > −T pdml s s l
where:
• -nr <pcapfilename> disables all name resolutions (n) and sets the filename to read from (r),
which is followed by the .pcap file name
• -2 sets the processing as a two-pass analysis, which causes tshark to buffer output until the
entire first pass is done, but allows it to fill in fields that require future knowledge, such as
’response in frame #’ fields. Also permits reassembly frame dependencies to be calculated
correctly 2
• -o ssl.keylog_ file:<sslkeysfilename> sets the SSL key log file we want to use in order to
decrypt the capture
• -T pdml defines the format of the output file
The database engine used was SQLite, which has a rich API interface with Python, which was
the programming language used throughout this work.
Figure 3.2: Data Flow
The scripts responsible for the transformations and conversions of the data until obtaining the
.db file were not developed in this dissertation, and were instead made available from prior work.
2https://www.wireshark.org/docs/man-pages/tshark.html
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After what is resumed in Figure 3.2, the .db file is the input of the Python script developed to
process the data. In the approach of the attack the DB file already contains the estimates of the
HTTP response sizes, in which the traffic is all encrypted. The Python script used to process the
.db file directly selects some features from it and calculates others in order to create new features,
such as the averages, as described in chapter 4.
3.1.4 Classification
In order to predict websites with a fingerprinting attack, we used the KNN classification algorithms
described in 2.5.1. We chose three values for K: 1, 3 and 5. To divide the data set in training and
testing, we simply randomized the data order, and took 75% of it for training and 25% for testing.
To put this algorithm in practice, we used the R 3.3.2 software and programming language.
The challenge of this work is to determine the features, among all of the proposed ones (Sec-
tion 4.1), which better represent and help identifying the websites. In order to discover those
we tested, for each K, every possible combination of features and applied the KNN algorithm.
This way, it was possible to verify which features and combinations of features have the highest
accuracy and thus are the best for the purpose of this work.
3.1.5 Measures
To measure how good the prediction results are, there are several statistical measures one can
use. From the classification algorithm used, a possible visualization of the performance of the
algorithm is through a confusion matrix. This matrix actually consists in a table in which the
columns represent the prediction and the rows represent the actual values of each class (or vice
versa, but in this study we used the rows as the true and the columns as the prediction). This table
aims at measuring the algorithm’s correct labelling of classes, as well as its mistakes. Table 3.1
shows an example of a confusion matrix. Note that this is a general example of a confusion matrix,
which means that one can have more columns and rows, depending on the number of classes. For
purposes of showing the four different concepts in a confusion matrix, it was shortened. In this
study the confusion matrix is 200x200.
Positive Prediction Negative Prediction
Positive Condition True Positive (TP) False Negative (FN)
Negative Condition False Positive (FP) True Negative (TN)
Table 3.1: Confusion matrix outline
In a confusion matrix, the four general names given to its cells are [26]:
• True Positive: Capture traffic from a website correctly predicted as the same website
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• False Negative (error): Capture traffic from a website predicted as a different website
• False Positive (error): Predicted a website for which the capture traffic did not belong to
• True Negative: Capture traffic which is not from a website, was not predicted as that web-
site
From the values of these fields, there are several metrics to evaluate. The ones used in this
work were [26]:
• Recall (True Positive Rate), which measures the proportion of positive conditions that are
correctly identified as such: T PR = ΣTruePositiveΣPositiveCondition
• Precision (Positive Predictive Value), which measures the proportion of the relevant in-
stances among all of the retrieved ones: PPV = ΣT PΣPositivePrediction
• Accuracy, which measures the proportion of correct predictions among every prediction,
or, in other words, the degree of closeness of the predictions to their true value [27]:
Accuracy = ΣT P+ΣT NΣTotalPopulation
• F1 score, which is a measure of the accuracy, by calculating the harmonic mean of precision
and sensitivity: F1 = 21
Precision+
1
Recall
= 2T P2T P+FP+FN
None of this features is a reliable metric for the performance of a classification algorithm by
themselves, because they are vague. For example, by the value of the accuracy it is not possible
to know if the majority of the errors were due to False Positives or False Negatives. Moreover, for
example when we want to tell, from a capture traffic of a website, how many of the predictions
made were from that website in relation to the ones that are actually from that website. If we tell
that all of them are from that website, we have a precision of 100%, which is misleading. This
was the reason why additional metrics were used, in order to have more significant and detailed
information about the results and the way the classifier performs.
Ultimately, these measures are what enables us to access the quality of our results.
3.2 Characterization of the Data Set
3.2.1 Diversity of Websites
Websites behave differently in several aspects, one of those being that some websites redirect the
client to other servers. These servers, which are chosen by the the way the website is designed
and implemented, may be diverse. They can use different software as HTTP server, with examples
such as Apache or Nginx, but they can also use different versions of HTTP. In this study we only
considered connections which use HTTP/2.
Different captures of the same website are likely different, for a number of reasons including:
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• Ads. Website traffic is highly influenced by the amount of publicity they have. Moreover,
the advertisement contents in a website are very likely to change over time.
• News websites vary their content regularly. Everyday there are different news, and so the
website usually has a different layout
• Social Networks. Although social networks’ homepages are generaLly the same, the web-
site’s feed is always changing and its content is unpredictable.
• The fact that the user is logged in or not. In some websites, if the user is already logged in,
the website will redirect it to other type of page whereas if it is not, the homepage will be
displayed.
Besides the fact that a great majority of websites change over the time, there is also the variant
that even doing several consecutive captures to the same website, we may end up having different
samples. Firstly, the simple geographical position of where the experiment was done makes the
difference. One of the reasons is because there is a completely distinct experience when accessing
a website with a nearby server than accessing other with a server on the other side of the world.
The latency will be higher and it will affect the connection. The other reason can be that depending
on the geographical position of the client, the website may redirect not only to a different server,
but also to a different website.
3.2.2 Web Object Size for All Captures
Taking a general approach, when evaluating the whole data set, the web object sizes have clear
pattern in the web object sizes. Figure 3.3 shows de CDF of the web object sizes, revealing
that one of the largest portions has a very small size (less than 100 bytes). From there, there is
an approximately even distribution of web object sizes, while there is a reduced amount of web
object sizes higher than 100KB. 13% of the web objects had a size of zero bytes and were not
included in the graphic.
3.2.3 Large Web Objects
The majority of websites have either 0, 1, 7 or 8 response data packets with a size larger than
100KB (figure 3.4). Furthermore, the website with the highest number of packets with a size
bigger than 100KB (website 35: tmall.com) has only 14 of these packets, which tells that this is a
unique feature, meaning that websites that have a value for this different than zero can be easily
identified.
3.2.4 Example: Google
Taking the example of the first website of the Alexa’s list: google.com. Its homepage is the one
shown in figure 3.5. This already exemplifies what has been described in section 3.2.1, which is
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Figure 3.3: CDF of HTTP Response Data Sizes
the fact that although the URL submitted was https://google.com, the server redirected the client
to Google Portugal (https://google.pt), which was the country in which the experiment took place.
3.2.4.1 Web Object Sizes
From the 10 repetitions made, this website’s web object (HTTP response data) sizes have a CDF
as shown in figure 3.6.
3.2.4.2 IP Addresses and TCP Connections
There are also several IP address that participate in the connection to this website. Table 3.2
enumerates the ones with at least one occurrence as well as their frequency.
For the 10 repetitions made for this website there was an average of 13,2 TCP connections
per website access and figure 3.7 shows the outline of the size of the SSL records for each TCP
connection. Note that the numbers of the TCP connections in the x-axis only represent TCP
connections in the access to the website which are directly related to SSL records of the website.
In other words, if for example the first TCP connection registered is not related to the website or
doesn’t have SSL, it is not considered.
It is possible to observe a clear pattern: in the beginning of the connection, for the first 6
TCP connections there are small SSL records. Then, in the TCP connections number 6 and 8
we have the majority of the information with SSL records over 300KB, and in the end it is more
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Figure 3.4: HTTP response data sizes higher than 100KB
unpredictable to determine the size of the SSL records, although they are relatively small (less
than 100KB).
Regarding the number of web objects per TCP connection, table 3.3 shows the behaviour of
the website for each repetition made.
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Figure 3.5: Google Homepage
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Figure 3.6: CDF of Google’s Web Object Sizes
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IP Address Frequency (%)
216.58.211.227 8,33
54.230.197.64 6,06
216.58.211.195 5,30
52.18.124.61 5,30
52.88.7.60 5,30
54.230.197.121 5,30
216.58.214.174 4,55
35.164.91.224 3,79
52.38.179.134 3,79
54.148.163.250 3,79
216.58.211.206 3,03
216.58.214.163 3,03
54.230.197.100 3,03
216.58.210.142 2,27
35.163.57.6 2,27
54.191.71.231 2,27
54.230.197.240 2,27
54.230.197.88 2,27
216.58.201.131 1,52
216.58.210.174 1,52
52.35.147.139 1,52
54.154.207.225 1,52
54.230.197.239 1,52
52.89.48.161 1,52
54.230.197.11 1,52
194.210.238.170 1,52
194.210.238.155 1,52
Table 3.2: IP Addresses used when accessing Google
Figure 3.7: Number of SSL Bytes in TCP Connections
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Web Objects
Repetition # TCP Streams Average Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation
1 5 3,2 1 11 4,38
2 4 4 1 10 3,78
3 4 4 1 12 5,35
4 3 5,33 1 13 6,66
5 3 5,33 2 10 4,16
6 4 4 1 10 4,08
7 6 2,67 1 10 3,61
8 5 3,2 1 11 4,38
9 3 5,33 1 12 5,86
10 2 8 6 10 2,83
Table 3.3: Web Objects per TCP Stream
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Chapter 4
Feature Selection and Analysis
A connection to a website is a two-way communication. The client (usually a web browser)
requests a web page, and the server responds, if possible, with the information requested. Usually
this consists in a combination of HTML documents, JS scripts and images. This information
reveals information about how a website behaves. Naturally, being below the encryption layer of
TLS, it will not be possible to have access to the contents of the connection.
To be able to fingerprint the websites, it is necessary to know what to fingerprint. Every
website is implemented in a different way, and all of them have different contents: different HTML
pages, different JS scripts and different styles. Moreover, the order with which each of these
contents is retrieved is also singular. It depends on how the website is built, how it is programmed
and also on the HTTP server used, which defines the way the web pages are stored, processed
and delivered to clients. There are numerous reasons why websites are implemented in different
ways. Different websites have different load limits, different vulnerabilities to attacks, and mainly
different contents. It is very different to have a website which has dynamic content when compared
to one which has static content. Plus, websites store cookies, cache and form data in distinct ways.
And ultimately, even the hardware and software of the operating system of the machine on which
the web server runs, makes the difference. These characteristics of websites are what make them
unique. However, there are still some that are more similar between them when compared to
others.
We are looking for a set of characteristics and features of a website which best enable their
identification. Ideally, the chosen features will make it possible for websites to be identified among
all the others, which together with the ideal machine learning and classification algorithm(s),
would represent a prediction efficiency of 100%. In the phase in which there is complete dis-
closure on the content of the traffic generated by each website, there is a much wider range of
features to choose from. This is because we have at our disposal every information from the
application layer, including the same which would be encrypted in a situation of an actual attack.
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4.1 List of Proposed Features
The set of features that were chosen was intended to be varied. The features only include packets
which include the application layer, i.e., HTTP, whether it is encrypted or not. The features chosen
were:
4.1.1 General Features
• F1: Number of SSL records;
• F2: Total size of SSL packets. This feature sums the size from every SSL packet in each
capture of each website;
• F3: Number of client to server packets. Number of packets that have the browser IP address
as the source and the server’s IP address as the destination;
• F4: Number of server to client packets. Similar to F3, except for the server to client direction
4.1.2 HTTP Features
• F5: Total size of HTTP request header. Feature that sums the size of the header in an HTTP
request, for every packet that contains it;
• F6: Average size of HTTP request header. Total size of HTTP request header divided by
the number of packets that contain a header in an HTTP request;
• F7: Total size of HTTP request data. Feature that sums the size of the data in an HTTP
request, for every packet that contains it;
• F8: Average size of HTTP request data. Total size of HTTP request data divided by the
number of packets that contain data in an HTTP request;
• F9: Total size of HTTP response header. Feature that sums the size of the header in an
HTTP response, for every packet that contains it;
• F10: Average size of HTTP response header. Average size of HTTP response header. Total
size of HTTP response header divided by the number of packets that contain a header in an
HTTP response;
• F11: Total size of HTTP response data. Feature that sums the size of the data in an HTTP
response, for every packet that contains it. HTTP response data carries the web objects sent
from the server;
• F12: Average size of HTTP response data. Total size of HTTP response data divided by the
number of packets that contain data in an HTTP response;
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4.1.3 Size Group Features
HTTP response data size is a feature with major importance. It is so because in the network traffic
it is the most direct characteristic of a website. It consists on the actual content a website delivers
to the client, and so it requires a more detailed analysis. For that, we divided this feature by size:
• F13: Number HTTP response data smaller than 100B
• F14: Number HTTP response data size between 100B and 1kB
• F15: Number HTTP response data size between 1kB and 10kB
• F16: Number HTTP response data size between 10kB and 100kB
• F17: Number HTTP response data size higher than 100kB
These were the totality of features taken into account by the study. The line of thinking was that
the more features were considered, the more information would come as a result, and consequently,
the more accurate would be the fingerprinting, although this may not always true.
4.2 Characterization of the Features
Table 4.1 shows some statistics regarding the totality of the collected data set for every feature,
namely fields such as minimum, maximum, average and standard deviation values. This table
serves to illustrate the wide variety of values that the features have.
4.3 Correlation
Correlation is a statistical measure that describes the degree of dependence between two variables.
However, simply saying correlation covers a wide range of definitions. There are several ways
of characterizing correlation, and consequently, different ways of calculating this value. One
measure of the linear correlation between two variables is the Pearson correlation coefficient1.
This coefficient is a value between −1 and 1, where 1 is the total positive linear correlation (direct
proportionality, which means that a change in one variable is accompanied by a change in the other,
related by a constant multiplier), 0 represents no linear correlation, and −1 is the total negative
linear correlation (inverse proportionality, the opposite of direct proportionality). Its formula is:
ρX ,Y = corr(X ,Y ) =
cov(X ,Y )
σXσY
=
E[(X−µX)(Y −µY )]
σXσY
(4.1)
where:
• cov(X ,Y ) is the covariance of X and Y
1Pearson Correlation. Kent State University. URL: http://libguides.library.kent.edu/SPSS/PearsonCorr
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Feature Minimum Maximum Average Deviation
Number of SSL records 0 3K 514,03 512,06
Total Size of SSL records 0 19,62M 1,39M 1,61M
Number of Client to Server Packets 0 466 73,32 76,63
Number of Server to Client Packets 0 2,62K 440,71 454,09
Total Size of HTTP Request Header 0 32,63K 3,42K 4,83K
Average Size of HTTP Request Header 0 650 156,23 135,26
Total Size of HTTP Request Data 0 39,25K 144,88 1,37K
Average Size of HTTP Request Data 0 3,57K 59,24 272,42
Total Size of HTTP Response Header 0 67,07K 4,06K 7,69K
Average Size of HTTP Response
Header
0 883 156,66 139,86
Total Size of HTTP Response Data 0 10,39M 524,46K 778,09K
Average Size of HTTP Response Data 0 76,39K 31,3K 57,87K
Number of HTTP response data sizes
less than 100B
0 53 1,79 4,45
Number of HTTP response data sizes
between 100B and 1KB
0 83 3,14 7,83
Number of HTTP response data sizes
between 1KB and 10KB
0 68 4,95 9,86
Number of HTTP response data sizes
between 10KB and 100KB
0 88 5,47 10,34
Number of HTTP response data sizes
higher than 100KB
0 14 1,77 2,86
Table 4.1: Data Set Statistics by Feature
• σ is the standard deviation
• µ is the mean
• E is the expectation
Applying this equation to the features mentioned above, the correlation result was the one
visible in Figure 4.1.
From this graphic there are several conclusions that can be drawn. One is that the number of
SSL records and the number of server to client packets have a high correlation coefficient. As a
result , one of these features could be ignored for this specific data set.
After testing every possible combination of all the features on the classifiers, we made some
adjustments. These consisted in selecting only the features which had essential information (not
redundant) and discarding those that introduced noise to the experiment. The choice of which
features to select and which to discard was directly related to the correlation obtained of the first
set of features, as it is shown in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: Correlation of Features
4.4 Features Effectiveness
4.4.1 General and HTTP Features
In a first experiment, we tested the data set in the classifier algorithm with all of the features in
sections 4.1. For this experiment, we used 75% of the data set as training and 25% as testing, and
for K=3 in the KNN classifier we had as a result the confusion matrix in figure 4.2.
In this confusion matrix, the darker the dots, the higher the number in the correspondent cell.
At a first glance, the perfectly visible bold diagonal line catches your attention. However, there is
some dispersion in the rest of the graphic. This means that the classification was not perfect, in
fact, the accuracy was just 36.8%.
The results when using every single feature chosen were not impressive. The best accuracy
value was 44,6% for K=1, while for K=3 was 34,6% and for K=5 it was 33,4%. This shows that
the use of all of the originally proposed features is not a good choice for fingerprinting websites in
the data set used.
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Figure 4.2: First Confusion Matrix
4.4.2 Worst Case Result Feature Combinations
Tables 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 show the worst features and combinations of features and the respective
accuracy for every K value chosen (1, 3 and 5). Here we use the feature nomination of section 4.1.
Features Accuracy (%)
F2, F13, F15, F16 25,2
F1, F2, F3, F13, F17 26
F2, F4, F8, F13, F14 26,4
F2, F3, F4, F8, F16 26,4
F2, F4, F10, F15 26,4
Table 4.2: Worst Features for K=1
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Features Accuracy (%)
F1, F2, F3, F8, F17 18,8
F2, F4, F13, F14, F15 19
F1, F2, F7, F14, F15 19
F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, F13, F14, F16, F17 19,2
F2, F3, F7, F14, F16 19,2
F1, F2, F7, F13 19,2
Table 4.3: Worst Features for K=3
Features Accuracy (%)
F2, F4, F6, F10, F13 16,2
F2, F7, F10, F13 16,4
F1, F2, F4, F6, F8 17,4
F2, F6, F7, F17 17,4
F2, F3, F4, F6, F16 17,6
F1, F2, F8, F14, F15 17,6
F2, F14, F15, F17 17,6
Table 4.4: Worst Features for K=5
From these tables, we can straightaway draw the conclusion that for the KNN classifier, K=1 is
clearly the one with best results and K=5 the one with the worst. This may happen due to the fact
that the higher the number of neighbors to take into account, the more noise is being introduced.
4.4.3 Best Case Feature Combination
Tables 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7 show the best features and combination of features and the respective
accuracy for every K value chosen (1, 3 and 5).
Features Accuracy (%)
F13 98,4
F16 98,4
F14, F16 98,4
F13, F15 98,2
F13, F14, F15, F16 98,2
Table 4.5: Best Features for K=1
The features that give the best accuracy results have the similarity of being part of the features
that divide HTTP response size by sizes (section 4.1.3). Like for the features with the worst
accuracy, the order of best parameter for K is still the same.
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Features Accuracy (%)
F14, F16 95,6
F16 95,2
F14, F15 95,2
F13 95
F13, F14 95
Table 4.6: Best Features for K=3
Features Accuracy (%)
F13, F14, F16 93
F14, F16 90,8
F14, F15, F16 90,8
F13, F15 90
Table 4.7: Best Features for K=5
Chapter 5
Results on Efficiency with HTTP/2
Here we describe the second approach of this work. We take the perspective of the attacker, in
which we do not have access to the decrypted traffic. The features used in this perspective result
from the estimation of HTTP response sizes from TLS records, done in [4], as it was explained
before.
The features chosen in chapter 4 were specific of the data set used in section 3.2. It was then
necessary to test them in a new data set to check if, in fact, they have good results. Consequently,
the data set used in this chapter is resultant from a new experience.
5.1 Comparison with Ground-truth Features
To be able to evaluate the limitations of fingerprinting in HTTP/2 web applications we need to
compare the results of the sets of features of the two approaches. The features and combinations of
features chosen were the ones which had higher accuracies, as described in section 4.4, and which
were common between both the ground-truth and the attacking perspectives. Figure 5.1 shows,
for K=1, the comparison of accuracies for the same features in the two perspectives. Figures 5.2
and 5.3 show the same for K=3 and K=5, respectively.
It is visible that even for a new data set, the best features for the Ground-Truth perspective are
approximately the same, and have high accuracies, just like for the original data set. This proves
that the features were chosen independently of the data set used.
We can then observe that for the same features and combinations of features the accuracies are
roughly the same. This can be due to two reasons:
• The estimation of HTTP Response Size performed well, and so the estimations were similar
to the actual values of HTTP Response Size and consequently the results were identical.
• The best features were identical for both perspectives. If the case was that the best features
were considerably different for both perspectives, the results would not be so similar.
35
36 Results on Efficiency with HTTP/2
Figure 5.1: Comparison of the Accuracy of Ground-Truth and Attack Features (K=1)
5.2 Pipelining and Multiplexing
The major difference in HTTP/2 when compared to previous versions of HTTP is the use of
pipelining and multiplexing. It is then of great importance to evaluate how these mechanisms
influence fingerprinting attacks. We first determined the amount of pipelining and multiplexing
each website used. For that, we came with a metric for each, a pipelining and a multiplexing
value. The pipelining value is the number of HTTP/2 pipelined bytes divided by the total number
of HTTP/2 bytes. The multiplexing value was determined by dividing the HTTP/2 multiplexed
bytes by the number of HTTP/2 pipelined bytes.
To evaluate the influence of these two aspects, we separated websites in three categories:
• No pipelining: websites which have an average of pipelining smaller than 0.05
• With pipelining: websites which have an average of pipelining higher than 0.05
• With multiplexing: websites which have an average of multiplexing higher than 0.05
61.5% of the websites are in ’No Pipelining’, 38.5% in ’With Pipelining’ and 11.5% in ’With
Multiplexing’.
Then we evaluated in a CDF the F1 Score, as defined in section 3.1.5, per website, for each of
the above categories. The result is shown in figure 5.4.
It is clear that the pipelining and multiplexing mechanisms have influence on the website’s
accuracy. This can be concluded by analyzing the different lines in the CDF graph. It is visible that
there is higher occurrence of low F1 scores with multiplexing and pipelining. On the other hand,
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Figure 5.2: Comparison of the Accuracy of Ground-Truth and Attack Features (K=3)
websites which don’t use pipelining have higher probability of being successfully fingerprinted.
In fact, more than 30% of websites which do not use pipelining have an F1 score of 100%.
Afterwards, we did the same, but instead of considering the F1 score of the attacking perspec-
tive, we used the difference between F1 scores of both the ground-truth and attacking approaches.
Thus we can evaluate not only the impact of pipelining and multiplexing, but also the difference it
makes when changing the approach. The result is shown in figure 5.5. The x-axis of the graphic
shows the absolute value of the difference of the F1 scores. F1 scores range from 0 to 1, so in this
graphic, values of the difference closer to 1 mean that the ground-truth and the attack perspective
have higher amount of different F1 scores, while values of the difference closer to 0 mean that
both perspectives have similar results.
The results are a bit different than the previous figure. In the two perspectives, multiplexing is
the category which is the least affected, having more F1 score differences closer to 0. Nonetheless,
for all the categories, almost 20% of websites have an equal score both for the ground-truth and
attacking approaches (difference equal to 0).
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Figure 5.3: Comparison of the Accuracy of Ground-Truth and Attack Features (K=5)
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
In this chapter we present the conclusions for this work. We summarize, discuss and try to explain
the results obtained. From there we try to present ways in which this work could be improved as
well as what can be studied further in order to have a deeper and more detailed approach to the
problem addressed in this work.
6.1 Discussion of Results
The results obtained in this work are promising. We show that it is feasible to successfully employ
fingerprinting attacks in websites using HTTP/2.
The features which provide higher accuracies are the ones related to the content websites
retrieve, namely the HTTP response sizes. It was somewhat expected that these would be the
ones with higher accuracies rather than other features such as the size of HTTP requests, because
the size of web objects is the size of the content of a website, which is what defines it best. We
improved the results by dividing this feature by intervals of sizes, instead of considering only the
total and the average values.
The best parameter of the K-NN algorithm was K=1. Because this algorithm makes its classi-
fication based on the nearest objects, the more objects there are to consider, the more likely it is to
consider objects which belong to other classes.
The accuracies of the fingerprinting attack were above 90%. This high number can be due to
the relatively small data set that was used, and also to the fact that, from the websites observed, a
large number of those use little pipelining and multiplexing. In fact, as described in section 5.2,
only 11.5% of websites used multiplexing and 38.5% used pipelining.
The use of pipelining and multiplexing was also proved to have a big impact on the ability
to employ fingerprinting attacks. The results are much better when the levels of pipelining and
multiplexing are low, which proves that using these mechanisms complicates the employment of
the attack.
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The estimations of HTTP response sizes from TLS records proved to have a good perfor-
mance. This is particularly relevant because it was a fundamental part of this dissertation, due to
its importance in the attacking perspective.
6.2 Future Work
This study has surely had some promising results. There is a clear relationship between the usage
of HTTP/2 by websites and the ability to fingerprint them. Furthermore, the amount of pipelin-
ing and multiplexing applied to the websites has also a strong influence in their identification.
However, there can be made some improvements to this study.
6.2.1 More substantial Results
Firstly, there may be used a bigger data set. 200 websites is practically nothing among the immense
quantity of websites existent. Doing this study to a reduced data set, although the targets were the
biggest websites, it does not come close to the characterization of the Internet. Therefore, there
should and must be used a much larger number of samples in order to have a more reliable study.
The classification is of great importance in this work. We used the K-NN algorithm and we
even used varied parameters in order to find the best one. However, it does not mean that this
is the best results we could achieve. There are numerous machine learning and classification
algorithms that could be applied for this work. An improvement to this study would be to apply
more classifiers to it and check how the results would differ.
6.2.2 New Contributions
When evaluating the web objects and their sizes, we treated all of them in an equal way. This is an
important issue, because there are web objects that can be shared by more than one website and
because in different captures of the same website there can be a variation on the web objects. For
that, we could use the entropy, which measures the amount of information in a message, or in this
case, a web object. The formula uses the probability of a web object size to appear in a website:
Entropyk =
n
∑
i=1
pki ∗ log( 1pki ) (6.1)
where:
• k is the index of the web object size
• n is the number of websites
• pki is the probability of the web object size k to appear on website i
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With this measure we could then evaluate every web object by this value. Instead of identifying
web objects by intervals of sizes, we could identify them by their exact value. From here we would
only consider those with low entropy, because those would be the most unique ones. Using only
these when analyzing the web objects could mean better results.
With a big data set, comes automation. For this dissertation it was not viable to analyze every
website in depth. We made a detailed approach for the case of Google in section (3.2.4), but that
was just made in order to give an example of the information gathered. To have a more significant
study, there could be made a more detailed and individual analysis for each website so that we
could extract every single website profile.
If an attack is proved to be successful, the natural order would be to find ways of defending
and preventing it. So, future work may include the definition of countermeasures in order to make
sure Internet users will not be victims of this type of attacks.
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